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INTRODUCTION
While several court rulings have recognized parental rights over
education to varying degrees,1 the emergence of a common public school
agenda has led to an increasing establishment of barriers limiting
opportunities for parents to exercise their rights and control over the
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1. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
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upbringing of their children via school choice initiatives.2 Parental rights and
the exercise of choice are further complicated and restricted for parents of
students with disabilities. Although the right to an education is protected
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA),3 parental
choice is recast as parental participation in the educational decisions affecting
children with disabilities. In other words, parents of students with disabilities
have no meaningful choice and can exercise extremely limited control over
the education and upbringing of their children if they want to enjoy the
protections afforded under the IDEA.4
The desire to exercise parental control and choice is often driven by
concerns about marked differences between personal beliefs and school
curricular choices,5 as well as the desire to raise children in accordance with
family values and traditions.6 Conflicts over curriculum have led to litigation
by many parents, albeit largely unsuccessful. In these cases, parents were
seeking relief from school board imposed instruction on topics ranging from
homosexuality, transgender issues, non-traditional family depictions, and
human sexuality in general.7 Although parental exercise of choice with
respect to their children’s educational, moral, and religious upbringing has
been at the core of many legal disputes between parents and school districts,8
there are a myriad of other factors influencing parental choice motives, such
as ideological beliefs,9 child-benefit theories,10 and special educational
needs.11
Efforts to diminish parents’ educational rights and choices have
occurred through deliberate governmental actions that were motivated in part
by fundamental beliefs about the role of public education in the furtherance
of state and national interests and preparation of educated members of
society.12 For example, state legislatures have adopted limits on parental
2. Curtis Schube, Public Schools are Replacing Parents: The Erosion of the Parental
Right to Control the Educational and Moral Upbringing of Children, 12 T.M. COOLEY J.
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 121, 121-45 (2010).
3. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485
(2012).
4. Id.
5. Kenneth L. Townsend, Education and the Constitution: Three Threats to Public
Schools and the Theories That Inspire Them, 85 MISS. L.J. 327, 330 (2016).
6. See Schube, supra note 2, at 137.
7. See id. at 121.
8. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
9. Henry M. Levin, The Public-Private Nexus in Education, 43 THE AM. BEHAV. SCI.
124, 135-36 (1999).
10. Ira Bloom, New Parental Rights Challenge to School Control: Has the Supreme
Court Mandated School Choice? 32 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 139-83 (2003) (identifying the
legitimate interests of parents in improving educational opportunities for their children).
11. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 557 U.S. 230, 234 (2009); Sch. Comm. of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 359 (1985).
12. See e.g., Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a
Multicultural Democracy, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 277, 290-91 (2001); John Dewey, The School as
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rights to control education and exercise choice in order to promote
assimilation13 and maintain separation between state government and
religious entities through state constitutional amendments, such as the Blaine
Amendments.14 Additional boundaries exist, perhaps unintentional but with
no less negative impacts, on parental rights and choice regarding the
education of students with disabilities who qualify for services under the
IDEA.15
Part I of this note examines the parental rights doctrine emerging
from the U.S. Supreme Court and describes the historical perspectives on
child development and educational interests that also factor into the
discussion about parental rights over education. The limits on parental rights
and control are analyzed in Part II, with specific attention on states’ legal
efforts—through constitutional and statutory provisions—to replace parental
control over education and upbringing with state control. Part III examines
the federal disability laws that apply specifically to protect the rights of
students with disabilities as well as the rights of their parents or guardians.
Part III also addresses the concerns of school choice opponents who assert
the need for limits on state-supported choice initiatives given the perceived
negative impacts of such programs on public education. Part IV summarizes
the promises and perils of special education voucher programs (SVPs), which
are often described as an emerging educational reform movement that seeks
to expand school choice options for parents of students with disabilities16 and
identifies the need for legislative reform of the IDEA. Finally, the Conclusion
offers concluding remarks and recommends expansion of the choice debate
in order to reflect a continuum perspective of educational placements that
empower parents of students with disabilities to preserve their family’s
values and beliefs while also securing a high-quality education for their
children.17
I.

THE PARENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The foremost exercise of parental choice is the de facto
determination of where to live. In other words, parental choice regarding the
education of children is primarily a factor of where parents decide to live
a Means of Developing Social Consciousness and Social Ideals in Children, 1 J. SOC.
FORCES 513, 516 (1923).
13. Mark E. DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551 (2003).
14. See Michael P. Dougherty, Montana’s Constitutional Prohibition on Aid to
Sectarian Schools: “Badge of Bigotry” or National Model for the Separation of Church and
State?, 77 MONT. L. REV. 41 (2016).
15. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2010).
16. See Susan C. Bon, Janet Decker & Natasha Strassfeld, Special Education Voucher
Programs, Reflective Judgment, and Future Legislative Recommendations, 91 PEABODY J.
OF EDUC. 503 (2015).
17. Bloom, supra note 10.

132

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5: 129

given the tradition in the United States of using geographic boundaries to
determine neighborhood public school attendance.18 The notion of
democratic localism19 preserved, to some extent, the balance of control
between parents and school districts. Namely, this theory proposed that
parents could maintain control over their values and beliefs through local
communities.20 In other words, parental control could occur through the local
community, which would make it unnecessary to formalize such control
through educational choice options.
School choice reform efforts, on the other hand, reflect deliberate
attempts by parents to exercise control over educational decisions for their
children by challenging established educational norms and asserting their
rights to circumvent the monopoly of public schools.21 While some have
argued that past choice initiatives were motivated by racial animus, 22 the
counter argument for choice is premised on ideological beliefs about values,
liberty, and freedom.23 In fact, parents’ desires to avoid influences over their
children that are inconsistent with their family values and beliefs are not
recent developments. Rather, parents have previously sought to advance their
religious interests and parental control over education in the courts.24
The essential role and influence of education on a child’s
development, according to Locke,25 establishes the importance of
maintaining parental control over the child’s educational experience.26
Through clarification about the unique roles of parents as leaders of the
family, churches as guardians of religion, and government as protectors of
civil society, Locke describes the boundaries and expectations regarding
these three distinctive societies.27 Despite varying interpretations of Locke’s
many essays, his assertions about the roles of parents, churches, and

18. John Merrifield, The Twelve Policy Approaches to Increased School Choice, 2 J.
SCH. CHOICE: INT’L RES. & REFORM 4, 6 (2008).
19. MICHAEL B. KATZ, CLASS, BUREAUCRACY, AND SCHOOLS: THE ILLUSION OF
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 17 (2d ed. 1975).
20. ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CHARTING CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM: DEMOCRATIC
LOCALISM AS A LEVER FOR CHANGE 254 (1998).
21. JOHN CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 189
(1990); see also Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment,
and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 665 (1998).
22. Mark A. Gooden, Huriya Jabbar & Mario S. Torres, Jr., Race and School
Vouchers: Legal, Historical, and Political Contexts, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 522, 523 (2016).
23. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, CHAP. VI: THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EDUCATION (M. Friedman, ed. 1962).
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
25. John Locke has written extensively about education and is cautiously described as
an “educationist” given his general theories which relate significantly to his work on
education. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (1989).
26. NATHAN TARCOV, LOCKE’S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY 3 (1999).
27. Alex Tuckness, Locke on Education and the Rights of Parents, 36 OXFORD REV.
EDUC. 627, 628 (2010).
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government reveal that the three societies are related, yet distinctly
responsible for particular roles.28
Locke asserts that the parents, as founders of the family, are uniquely
responsible for the care and education of their children.29 With respect to
religion, Locke asserts that spiritual endeavor is both the foundation of
churches and the responsibility of churches to pursue and cultivate.30 He
further explains that neither the civil society nor government is responsible
for, nor should it impede, religious ends.31 Instead, society benefits from the
formation of governmental structures that are designed to pursue the civil
interests of citizens through economic, military, and other necessary
structures that protect life and property.32
As revealed in Locke’s essays, there exists an impending tension
between parental interests over controlling their children’s education and the
goal of government to promote education for the good of society.33 While
affirmation of these concurrent rights is enshrined in the United States
Constitution, efforts to balance the potentially conflicting rights emerge in
the courts where the constitutional rights are interpreted with deference to the
varying contexts in which such disputes arise.34 Despite assertions that there
is not a specified parental right to control the educational upbringing of
children, a series of judicial affirmations regarding parents’ rights to select
homeschooling as well as private school enrollment in fulfillment of
compulsory attendance laws is evidence that courts recognize parental rights
to choose from among a continuum of options when determining their
children’s educational settings.35
Three U.S. Supreme Court cases are presented in this article as
historical evidence of the legally recognized rights and responsibilities of
parents to educate their children.36 These cases fall along two controlling
lines of theories regarding the parental rights doctrine. First, in two bulwark
cases, the Supreme Court asserts that parents have clearly-established
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests to direct their children’s education.37
28. Id. at 634.
29. Id.; See also Rachel E. Taylor, Responsibility for the Soul of the Child: The Role of
the State and Parents in Determining Religious Upbringing and Education, 29 INT’L J. L.,
POL’Y & THE FAM. 15-35 (2015) (discussing a similar initiative in the United Kingdom).
30. TARCOV, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 49-50 (1987).
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
35. Chad Olsen, Constitutionality of Home Education: How the Supreme Court and
American History Endorse Parental Choice, 2 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 399, 410 (2009).
36. Eric M. Zimmerman, Defending the Parental Right to Direct Education: Meyer
and Pierce as Bulwarks Against State Indoctrination, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 311, 311
(2004/2005); Heather M. Good, The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution: The Parental Free
Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY
L.J. 641, 646-48 (2005).
37. Olsen, supra note 35, at 410-11.
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Second, the Supreme Court recognized a higher standard of review required
when parents exercise their liberty interests in connection with their free
exercise of religion rights.38
A.

Fundamental Rights Claim: Fourteenth Amendment Liberty
Interest

The parental liberty interest doctrine emerged from a direct conflict
between a state legislature and foreign language teacher.39 Interestingly, the
state’s interests were in direct conflict with both the teacher’s and parent’s
interests in providing an education to the child.40 As the Supreme Court
observed, the “right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to
instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.”41
Although some might argue the primary outcome of Meyer v. Nebraska was
to protect the right to teach,42 the oft-quoted opinion suggests the Court was
especially influenced by a similar desire to protect parental rights over their
children.43
The Meyer Court explicitly hesitated to define the exact meaning of
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment protections, “No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”44 Nonetheless, the Court explained that liberty interests have been
defined with certain clarity to include
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.45
Accordingly, Justice McReynolds asserted that the statute requiring
English-only instruction in the public schools was an unreasonable and

38. Id. at 411-12.
39. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1923).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 400.
42. David M. Wagner, Homeschooling as a Constitutional Right: A Close Look at
Meyer and Pierce and the Lochner-Based Assumptions They Made About State Regulatory
Power, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 385, 389 (2014).
43. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
44. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
45. Id.
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arbitrary interference with established parental rights as well as the teacher’s
rights. 46
Pierce v. Society of Sisters47 further strengthened the parental liberty
interest doctrine and serves as a watershed case, in combination with Meyer,
for the parental choice movement.48 Parents of students with disabilities who
seek to exert choice and control over their children’s educational
opportunities have consistently relied on Pierce as support for private school
enrollment decisions.49 In Pierce, the right of parents to choose a private
school emerged as a liberty interest as a result of a conflict between two
private schools and the state of Oregon over the enforcement of compulsory
attendance laws.50 According to the Court, the parents’ liberty interest was
unreasonably burdened when the state sought to “standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”51 This case did
not, however, negate states’ legitimate interests in educating all children
residing within their states and communities. As such, parents could not
preserve unlimited parental rights solely through geographic choices.
In Pierce, the Court applied the Meyer v. Nebraska52 doctrine as a
bar against state action that would unreasonably interfere with the “liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control” secured by the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
protections.53 Subsequently, in Griswold v. Connecticut,54 the Supreme Court
asserted “the right to educate one’s children as one chooses is made
applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,” and added, “[W]e reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the
Meyer cases.”55 Further, the Court noted that even though the parents’ rights
to choose public, private, or parochial are not mentioned in the Constitution
or Bill of Rights, the spirit of the First Amendment includes such peripheral
rights.56
The parental rights doctrine has repeatedly been endorsed by the
courts, as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

46. Id. at 403.
47. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
48. Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 325.
49. See Debra Drang & Margaret J. McLaughlin, Special Education Services for
Parentally Placed Private School Students, 21 J. SPEC. EDUC. LEADERSHIP 3 (2008).
50. Wagner, supra note 42, at 411.
51. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
52. See 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
53. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
54. See 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. Id. at 482-83. (“The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice -whether public or private or parochial -- is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any
particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to
include certain of those rights.”).
56. Id. at 483.
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Amendment.57 For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,58 the Supreme Court
recognized Meyer59 and Pierce60 as long standing precedents that affirmed
parents’ fundamental interests in the education and religious upbringing of
their children.61 More recently, in Gruenke v. Seip, the Third Circuit Court
recognized that “[t]he right of parents to raise their children without undue
state interference is well established.”62
The Meyer-Pierce cases demonstrated that parents might be able to
find recourse within the courts in response to governmental intrusions and
interferences in their exercise of parental rights to direct the education and
upbringing of their children. The section below describes how the hybrid
rights claim gained recognition when the parental rights doctrine, in
combination with a free exercise of religion claim, was asserted in a case
involving a conflict between the parent’s control over the child’s religious
and educational upbringing and the state’s interest in promoting education.
B.

Hybrid Rights Claim: Liberty Interest & Free Exercise of
Religion

The parental rights doctrine established in Pierce and Meyer was
reasserted in Wisconsin v. Yoder,63 by Amish parents who refused to send
their children to a public school beyond a certain age, despite compulsory
attendance laws to the contrary.64 The Amish parents asserted that the state
compulsory attendance law imposed an undue burden on their First
Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process rights regarding the direction of their children’s religious
upbringing.65 While the Court recognized the state’s interest in education, it
rejected the imposition on parents’ fundamental rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and on parents’ traditional interest
in overseeing the religious upbringing of their children.66
The Court concluded, “[W]hen the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record,
more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s
requirement under the First Amendment.”67 Additionally, the Court asserted
57. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3rd Cir. 2000).
58. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
59. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
60. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
61. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303.
62. Id.
63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972).
64. James G. Dwyer, Religious Schooling and Homeschooling Before and After
Hobby Lobby, 16 U. ILL. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (2016).
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 233.

2018]

PROMISE OR PERIL

137

that “parental educational rights as a form of religious liberty . . . were due
the same consideration afforded free exercise rights—rights which had
trumped competing state interests since ‘[l]ong before’ anyone
acknowledged a need for public education.”68 The Supreme Court’s decision
in this case is noteworthy given the recognition of a hybrid rights claim
requiring more stringent judicial review when examining combined claims
based on parents’ First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests.69
Despite assertions that hybrid rights claims are merely dicta,70 and
thus Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests and First Amendment free
exercise rights are not strengthened to the extent of raising the level of
scrutiny required,71 the Supreme Court has previously made this very claim.
Specifically, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
noted:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of
the First, is much more definite than the test when only the
Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due
process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of
the First become its standard.72
Barnette reinforces credibility of the hybrid rights claims by
recognizing the enhanced protections necessary when Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are combined with First Amendment
protections.73
In fact, the Supreme Court has continued to affirm the parental rights
doctrine as it applies to educational choices when parental interests conflict
with state interests.74 In Troxel v. Granville,75 the Supreme Court affirmed
the rights of parents to homeschool their children and to select private school
options to meet state compulsory attendance laws. In essence, the Court
reaffirmed that parents may choose from a continuum of options when

68. Matthew Steilen, Parental Rights and the State Regulation of Religious Schools,
2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 269, 274 (2009).
69. Id. at 339 (asserting that strict scrutiny may be the appropriate standard of review
when both religious and parental rights doctrines are violated by state action).
70. Kyle Still, Smith’s Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An Unintelligent
Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 409 (2006); Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231
(3rd Cir. 2008).
71. Still, supra note 70, at 414.
72. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943).
73. Schube, supra note 2, at 129-140.
74. See Bloom, supra note 10, at 177.
75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (asserting that the substantive due process
protections affirmed in Pierce guaranteed the fundamental liberty interests of parents to
control their children’s education).
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determining their children’s educational settings.76 According to the Court,
parents’ interest “in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.”77
Although the opponents of school choice are generally concerned
about the use of public funds to support private schools rather than focused
on limiting parents’ exercise of control over education, the difficulty lies in
trying to achieve balance between the states’ interests and parental rights to
control education.78 For example, parents’ concerns range from disputes over
curriculum choices that offend parents’ religious beliefs and family values,79
to politically motivated concerns about curriculum that conflicts with
parents’ ideals.80 School choice opponents do not appear to disagree with
parental choice when it is exercised individually with no impact on the public
school’s authority over education, but rather focus on how the unregulated
exercise of choice affects the rights of students remaining in public school
systems. Despite assertions that Pierce and Meyer were, in essence, focused
on the extent of governmental limits regarding education rather than about
assuring parental rights,81 these cases along with Yoder are consistently used
to guide decisions that require balancing state interests against parental
control over their children’s education. The exercise of parental control over
the education and upbringing of children is increasingly sought through the
adoption and spread of school choice reform initiatives. Yet, efforts to reform
education through choice initiatives have been met with opposition.82
Notably, discussions about parental choice have historically
neglected the rights of parents to exercise control and choice regarding the
education of students with disabilities.83 However, critical examination of
school choice reform initiatives, such as charter schools and voucher
programs, has revealed that both programs were largely unavailable to
students with disabilities until recently. Now that discussions are evolving
within the education reform choice movement to include options such as
vouchers for students with disabilities, such efforts have encountered
resistance from states and school choice opponents.84

76. See Bloom, supra note 10, at 169.
77. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
78. See Good, supra note 36, at 670.
79. See e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Public Schs., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir.
1987).
80. Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education: Parents, Children,
and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1369 (2006-2007).
81. See Wagner, supra note 42, at 404.
82. Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 819 (2011); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out
Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2014).
83. See Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16.
84. Infra Part II.
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LIMITS ON PARENTAL RIGHTS AND CHOICE

Despite general perceptions that the U.S. Constitution is the
foundation upon which the Supreme Court established a parental rights
doctrine,85 competing perspectives offer an alternative view in an effort to
limit parental rights and the exercise of choice.86 Specifically, several lower
court decisions recognize limits on the fundamental parental rights
doctrine.87 Similarly, a few legal scholars have argued that the Supreme
Court has established a parental rights doctrine only insofar as the Court
recognized that a state may not unreasonably restrict parental control over
their children, particularly with respect to education.88
The parental rights movement peaked at the state level in 1996 when
a general election ballot measure was introduced to amend the Colorado
Constitution.89 The amendment would have established parents’ inalienable
right to determine the education, values, and discipline of their children.90
Although this initiative failed, the perception remains that parents need
protection from state (and federal) efforts to exert undue influence over the
upbringing and education of their children.91
As a result of tensions between state interests and parental control,
parents have sought relief in the courts from perceived governmental
overreach with respect to education and parental control over children in
general. Given the overwhelming lack of success by parents who challenged
school curricular choices across the states,92 parents had to seek other
85. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
86. See generally JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD (2014).
87. See e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir.
1995) (“We need not decide here whether the right to rear one’s children is fundamental
because we find that, even if it were, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an intrusion of
constitutional magnitude on this right.”); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381,
395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“While parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send
their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a
public school teaches their child.”).
88. See generally SHULMAN, supra note 86.
89. Linda Lane, The Parental Rights Movement, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 825 (1998).
90. Id.
91. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d at 530; Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 312;
Bruce H. Schwartz, Parental Rights: Educational Alternatives and Curriculum Control, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 277, 285 (1979).
92. For an overview of parents’ unsuccessful state cases challenging curriculum, see
Schube, supra note 2, at 132-37; see also Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Public Schs. 827 F.2d
1058, 1070 (1987) (finding that a public school’s requirement to study a particular Holt
reader series “does not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise Clause
when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or engage or refrain from
engaging in a practice prohibited or required by their religion. There was no evidence that
the conduct required of the students was forbidden by their religion. Rather, the witnesses
testified that reading the Holt series ‘could’ or ‘might’ lead the students to come to
conclusions that were contrary to teachings of their and their parents’ religious beliefs.”).
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alternatives through education reforms that endorsed parental choice. These
alternatives included charter school movements, homeschooling, and
voucher programs, among others. In other words, parents who perceived that
“the states are . . . stripping the parents of their right to guide their children’s
moral and religious upbringing”93 began searching for another avenue to
protect their rights. Charter schools appear to offer a viable option to some
parents, who desire the control to choose educational options that are
different from “the curricular rigidity of a common schooling,” and are not
necessarily seeking a religious school option.94
The use of vouchers, however, is possibly more vulnerable than
charter school options to constitutional or legislative barriers that limit the
use of public funds for religious schools, due to concerns that such
intermingling would violate the Establishment Clause. To some degree, the
vulnerability of voucher programs is a result of anti-Catholic bias that swept
the country and led many states to adopt state constitutional amendments that
prohibited state support for religious schools.95
This anti-Catholic bias emerged despite the failed efforts of
Congressman James Blaine to introduce a constitutional amendment that
would prohibit the distribution of state funds to religious schools.96 Blaine’s
efforts sparked widespread adoption of constitutional provisions that
restricted the flow of state funds to religious schools.97 The resulting Blaine
Amendments were fostered in growth by Protestant unease with an
increasing Catholic presence and resistance to the Protestant dominated
public school curriculum.98 The following section briefly discusses the
impact of the Blaine Amendments on parental choice, examines the
collective purpose of education in society, and identifies the historic impact
of racial animus on the rise of voucher programs.
A.

Blaine Amendments

Voucher programs will frequently involve the use of public dollars
to fund private, oftentimes religious, schools. This use of public money in a
religiously affiliated setting has led to criticism and conflict regarding
application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Blaine Amendment
provisions that widely exist in state constitutions.99 Special education
voucher programs—often referred to as scholarships—have been
successfully challenged in several state courts based on the invocation of the

93. Schube, supra note 2, at 121.
94. SHULMAN, supra note 86, at 162-63.
95. See e.g., DeForrest, supra note 13, at 583-84; Dougherty, supra note 14, at 42.
96. Dougherty, supra note 14, at 44.
97. Id. at 44-45.
98. Id.
99. Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special
Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 311 (2010).
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Blaine provisions in state constitutions.100 On the other hand, the majority of
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment Establishment Clause, which is
frequently cited when justifying the need for separation of church and state,
have been unsuccessful.101
Despite the widely-accepted anti-Catholic bias of the Blaine
Amendments,102 the Supreme Court is seemingly reluctant to squarely
address the constitutionality issue.103 Yet, the issue was implicated in Trinity
Lutheran v. Comer,104 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of religious
liberties by holding a state policy denying grants to religious entities violated
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Despite tentative predictions that
Trinity could prove the death knell for the Blaine Amendments,105 the Court
drew upon the previous attempt to balance the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses instead of ruling directly on the constitutionality of the
Blaine Amendments.106
B.

Education’s Collective Purpose

Opponents of school choice reform initiatives have often expressed
concerns about parental choice reforms interfering with the important
societal role of education in building collective purpose.107 In fact, the state’s
argument in Yoder was premised in part on the ideals espoused by Thomas
Jefferson, who “pointed out early in our history, that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence.”108 This essential argument about the greater purpose of
education was rejected in Yoder, insofar as it interfered with the Amish
parent’s combined liberty interest and free exercise rights.

100. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v.
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461, 479 (Colo. 2015). (Both state supreme courts
invalidated the voucher programs which permitted public funds to be used by students with
disabilities to attend private schools on Blaine Amendment grounds.).
101. Zelman v. Simmons-Harrris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-49, 662-63 (2002); Shannon S.
Taylor, Special Education, Private Schools, and Vouchers: Do All Students Get a Choice?,
34 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 7 (2005).
102. DeForrest, supra note 13, at 570; Dougherty, supra note 14, at 42.
103. DeForrest, supra note 13, at 553.
104. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024
(2017).
105. Nicole S. Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation of
Education Law, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1, 51 (2017).
106. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 276 (1981) (“[T]he state interest asserted
here—in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the
Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.”).
107. Jay P. Greene & Stephen Buck, The Case for Special Education Vouchers, 10
EDUC. NEXT, 36, 42 (2010); Minow, supra note 82, at 842.
108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
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Race and School Vouchers

Historically, evidence suggests that vouchers have been used to
avoid desegregation efforts109 and to provide segregated publicly funded
educational options for middle-class parents.110 In Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County,111 the Virginia General Assembly
authorized the use of state funds to support public or non-sectarian private
schools, which subsequently led a Virginia county to close all public schools
and adopt vouchers for purposes of funding attendance at all-white private
educational institutions. This historical context has contributed to numerous
concerns about the risks associated with school vouchers.112
Drawing from the Supreme Court’s rationale in Milliken v.
Bradley,113 the scope of remedies to address racial discrimination found to be
in violation of the equal protection clause is not unlimited. As such, the
Supreme Court rejected the proposed plan requiring compulsory transfer of
students across the Detroit public school system and the suburban districts
bordering Detroit.114 Analogous claims to limit private school vouchers for
students with disabilities, because permitting such choice would impact the
civil rights of other students, are similarly problematic because such
restraints transfer the burden from school districts to individual parents and
children. The following section seeks to extend discussion beyond the
balance of state and parental interests, by embarking on an examination of
the federal government’s impact on parental control over education,
particularly given the strict limitations on financial support available via the
federal disability legislation, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).115
III.

EDUCATION AND FEDERAL DISABILITY LAWS

For purposes of this article, it is helpful to have a basic understanding
of the essential federal disability laws protecting the rights of students with
disabilities as well as the rights of their parents or guardians. Thus, this Part
briefly summarizes the key legal provisions of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),116 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1974 (Section 504),117 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008

109. Gooden, Jabbar & Torres, supra note 22, at 523.
110. M. T. O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial
Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 364 (1997).
111. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964).
112. Rachel E. Taylor, supra note 29, at 2.
113. Garnett, supra note 105, at 11.
114. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
115. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (2010).
116. Id.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016).
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(ADA).118 Particular focus is paid to the IDEA given the targeted application
of this federal law on ensuring educational benefit, meeting the
individualized needs of students with disabilities, and guaranteeing parental
rights and control over their children’s education.
The explicit provisions of the IDEA protecting parental rights
regarding the education of their children are a fundamental aspect of this
federal law. Understanding these rights, not only in the public school setting
but also in a wider education arena, is a critical element of this article.
According to the IDEA, public schools are required to provide a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment
(LRE) to students with disabilities.119 While the onus is clearly placed on
public schools to comply with the IDEA mandate, parents are similarly
burdened because the critical IDEA financial support and legal protections
are lost by parents who exercise choice over the education and upbringing of
their children. Specifically, public schools enjoy financial benefits and
funding along with the strict legal mandates of the IDEA, and students with
disabilities receive only what has been determined by the schools and school
officials to be appropriate. Furthermore, private schools and other
educational choice options are simply unavailable to the majority of students
with disabilities because in these alternative settings, the students are not
provided with financial support nor protected by the legal mandates that
would benefit students with disabilities.
The IDEA also addresses parental participation through mandates
such as the due process hearing protections that ensure parents are included
in the processes of identifying, evaluating, and placing their children in
appropriate educational settings.120 Furthermore, parental rights and interests
in providing for the educational needs of children with disabilities are directly
addressed in our national disability policy, which furthers parents’ interests
to pursue “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency” for their children with disabilities.121
Parental interests in achieving these educational outcomes are further
protected under the IDEA through guarantees to access the necessary and
appropriate educational programs and services at no expense to the parent.122
In order to achieve this provision of the IDEA, the unique educational needs
of students with disabilities are to be identified in an individualized education
program (IEP).123 Parents are critical members of the IEP development
process and public schools are required to take specific steps that ensure
parental participation in the development of the IEP during the IEP team
118. Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2009).
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(e)(3)(F) (2010).
120. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i), 1414(f) (2010).
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2010).
122. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), 1412(a)(1)(A) (2010).
123. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (2010).
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meeting.124 Furthermore, public schools “must ensure that a parent of each
child with a disability is a member of any group that makes decisions on the
educational placement”125 and the provision of FAPE to the child.126
The FAPE provision has been interpreted as an essential provision
of the IDEA requiring public schools to provide educational benefits to
students.127 This benefit must meet more than a de minimis standard.128 As
cited by the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District
RE-1, “[A] student offered an educational program providing ‘merely more
than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been
offered an education at all.”129
Although several in the disability community commended Endrew
for dramatically improving the likelihood of positive educational
opportunities for students with disabilities, it is still unclear if the decision
will have any impact on parental choice or control over children with
disabilities.
Parental rights are generally protected with respect to educational
choices such as the decision to enroll children in private school settings or
homeschool children; however, the rights guaranteed under the IDEA are not
guaranteed to parents who exercise these choices. Specifically, the public
school system is not required to offer a FAPE to the student, whose parents
have chosen education in a private school or home school setting. In other
words, if parents fail to consent to the provision of services offered in the
public school setting, the public school’s responsibility under the IDEA is
essentially terminated. Furthermore, if the parents opt unilaterally to place
their child in a private-school setting because they disagree or are unhappy
with the public school IEP, services, or placement, there are limited
circumstances in which the parents may seek reimbursement for the private
school tuition or financial support for the home schooling option.
Private school placements are an option, and tuition may be
reimbursable under the IDEA in two general circumstances. First, tuition
reimbursement of a private school placement may occur if the IEP team
determines that the appropriate education, including placement, programs,
and services, must occur in a private school setting to ensure the student
receives FAPE.130 This first scenario is achieved through the cooperative
efforts of parents and school officials, and the private school placement must
be provided at no cost to the parents.131 In the second scenario, tuition
reimbursement for private school placement may occur when parents are able
124. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(e), 1415(b)(1) (2010); 34 C.F.R. § 300.322 (2006).
125. 34 C.F.R. § 501(c)(1) (2006).
126. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(e), 1415(b)(1) (2010).
127. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 177
(1982).
128. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
129. Id.
130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.145-300.147 (2006).
131. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (2006).
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to demonstrate that the public school failed to provide an appropriate
education.132
In general, decisions about private school enrollment are made
following an interaction and consultation between parents and public school
officials. Private school attendance is oft-viewed as an option reserved solely
for wealthy and privileged individuals and can prove especially difficult to
access for parents of students with disabilities.133 Given the legal parameters
of the IDEA as explained in this Part, parents of students with disabilities are
typically forced to take legal action in order to access private school options
using public funds to support tuition expenses.
Typically, the educational options available to parents of students
with disabilities are determined by the IEP team or through litigation.
Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed that public funds
could be available to cover tuition for a student with a disability whose
parents select the home schooling option.134 In this case, the court recognized
that parents may request financial support for home instruction given the
broad remedial authority of IDEA.135
If special education voucher programs were available to parents of
children with disabilities, this would provide increased choice, but also an
alternate pathway for parental control over the upbringing of their children.
Although the lure of choice appears to provide a distinct advantage to parents,
some critics assert that parents and students with disabilities could be
vulnerable in a private educational setting if it is not fully sanctioned by the
public school.136 In other words, if parents do not pursue litigation to force a
school board to award tuition reimbursement for the private school or do not
succeed in convincing the school board to establish a private school setting
as the appropriate placements ensuring FAPE, their choice of enrolling their
child in a private school setting would result in the loss of federal funding
and the protection afforded by the IDEA.

132. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 360 (1985) (Ruling
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985, in the landmark case, affirmed that tuition
reimbursement for private school may be provided to parents who successfully assert that
the public school has failed to provide an appropriate education to their child, who qualifies
as a student with a disability); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993)
(finding parents are eligible for tuition reimbursement even though their child is placed in a
non-approved private school because the child’s right to FAPE exceeds limits established by
the administrative and procedural aspects of the IDEA).
133. The Condition of Education 1997, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS
1, 148, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97388.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2017); See Elisa Hyman,
Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails Families Without Means:
Causes and Corrections From the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20 J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 111 (2006).
134. R.L., S.L. ex rel. O.L. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 757 F.3d 1173, 1191 (11th
Cir. 2014).
135. Id. at 1192.
136. See generally Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16.
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Although the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not
as extensive as the IDEA in terms of providing specialized protections for
students with disabilities, these federal protections would provide minimal
safeguards for parents who enroll their children in private schools through
the special education voucher programs.137 Specifically, private and public
schools are not permitted to discriminate or prohibit access to individuals
with disabilities who seek to participate in the schools’ services, programs,
and activities.138 Even when the student would not qualify under the IDEA,
Section 504 and the ADA are interpreted as coextensive laws protecting the
rights of students with disabilities to be free from discrimination and provide
parents an avenue to pursue litigation.139 However, Section 504 and the ADA
may not apply in all circumstances. For example, if the private school does
not receive public funding, Section 504 does not apply; and if the private
school has fewer than twenty-five employees or has a religious affiliation
waiver, it is possible that accommodations may not be required in the private
school setting.140
The efforts to hinder states from adopting special education voucher
programs stem from essentially three basic concerns about the impact of
vouchers on public schools and the well-being of students with disabilities.
First, if students with disabilities are permitted to use vouchers to attend
private schools, other students, whose parents choose not to access vouchers,
will be left behind in underperforming public schools given the misdirection
of public funds to private school settings.141 Second, the vouchers flow into
private school settings with limited accountability for the use or results of
such funds.142 Third and finally, if parents opt to enroll their child in a private
school setting using a voucher, they will forfeit their rights and their
children’s rights to the IDEA legal protections.143
In response to the concerns raised by voucher opponents, proponents
assert, “Rather than forcing dissatisfied families to accept subpar services or
to pursue legal action for relief, vouchers permit a lower conflict, lower-cost
method for resolving disagreements about the adequacy of public school

137. Id.
138. Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2009).
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(b), 12201(a) (2010).
140. See, e.g., Shannon S. Taylor, supra note 101; Wendy F. Hensel, Recent
Developments in Voucher Programs for Students with Disabilities, 59 LOY. L. REV. 323
(2013).
141. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Preserving Public Values in the Private Sector:
Unintended Consequences or Vouching for Ableism-Free Schools?, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 369
(2016); Brian Gill et al., Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and What We Need to
Know About Voucher and Charter Schools, 2 RAND EDUC. 118 (2007).
142. Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax Benefits in
Federal and State Judicial Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1433 (2016).
143. See generally Hensel, supra note 99.
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efforts.”144 The potential promise of school reform efforts has not yet been
adequately provided to students with disabilities. In other words, the
opportunities to exercise parental control over the education and upbringing
of children are not accessible to parents of students with disabilities. Through
ongoing reiterations of the IDEA parental rights provisions, the quality of
and opportunity to access educational programs and services have
dramatically improved for students with disabilities, however.145 Further, the
long-term commitment to parental participation as a pivotal feature of the
IDEA is evidence of the keen awareness of how critical it is for parents to be
active participants in their children’s educational decisions.146
Access to SVPs would provide parents of students with disabilities
meaningful choice options and the ability to determine if a nonpublic setting
might better meet the needs and preferences of their child and family.
Although the IDEA envisions the possibility of private school placement for
students with disabilities, this would typically involve a costly and timeconsuming encounter with the public school, whether through a due process
hearing or possibly even litigation in the courts. Special education voucher
programs offer families a choice that currently is fairly limited. Furthermore,
given the limits on federal funds provided in support of students who qualify
for programs and services under the IDEA, the public school option is given
preferential treatment as the best option for all students with disabilities.
Amidst the debate and increasing interest in the expansion of
educational choices for parents, concerns have also arisen regarding the
application of federal disability laws to public charter schools.147
Fundamentally, the rigorous and prescriptive application of federal disability
laws, such as the IDEA, on charter schools could likely curtail the very goal
of independence and innovation enjoyed by charter school initiatives. Yet,
without such laws, others express concern that students with disabilities
might be neglected by the charter school reform movement. Further, without
the IDEA accountability measures, students with disabilities and their parents
risk access to essential programs and services to meet the child’s individual
needs.
Finally, given the extremely acrimonious nature of special education
issues and the high number of due process and court cases initiated by
parents, the benefits of IDEA are likely not enjoyed by all parents of students

144. Jay P. Greene & Stephen Buck, The Case for Special Education Vouchers, 10
EDUC. NEXT 36 (2010).
145. Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Parents as Advocates: Examining the History and
Evolution of Parents’ Rights to Advocate for Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 34
J. LEGIS. 123, 142 (2008).
146. H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Reauthorization: Accountability and Personal Responsibility, 26(6) REM. & SPEC. EDUC. 320
(2005).
147. See Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability
Law, and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1997).
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with disabilities.148 Special education voucher programs may provide a
meaningful opportunity for parents to adopt an alternative to litigation. The
following Part highlights the key aspects of special education voucher
programs and proposes the legislative reforms needed to extend the rights
and financial supports of the IDEA to parents of students with disabilities
who exercise choice by deciding to educate their children in non-public
school settings.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM: SPECIAL EDUCATION VOUCHER PROGRAMS
AND THE IDEA
Special education voucher programs (SVPs) are part of a growing
educational reform movement focused on expanding school choice options
to parents of students with disabilities.149 “As is the case with many schoolchoice programs, SVPs are highly controversial and politically charged.”150
Specifically, voucher programs have sparked both ideological151 and legal152
debates among educational policy reformers regarding the burdens153 and
benefits154 of permitting parents to use publicly-funded vouchers to pay for
private school tuition or services. According to proponents of this
educational reform, “special education vouchers essentially use public funds
to democratize access to private placement by reducing legal and financial
barriers.”155 Opponents, on the other hand, assert, for example, that SVPs are
contrary to the civil rights agenda in that they lead to further segregation both
economically and racially, which then leads to diminished educational
opportunities for students unable to benefit from the vouchers. The
opponents also indicated that SVPs may put the educational needs of students
with disabilities at risk because the nonpublic settings are not obligated to
adhere to the federal protections provided by the IDEA.
The likelihood of a dramatic increase in private school options is
seemingly possible given recent momentum. While this momentum has
included publicly-funded SVPs, lingering concerns about how federal
disability laws apply in such settings reveal the need for legislative reform.
Learning from statewide efforts to adopt SVPs, as well as the challenges from
those who are opposed to such reform efforts, future initiatives should

148. Hyman, Rivkin & Rosenbaum, supra note 133 (asserting that the complexity of
IDEA systematically leads to the denial of educational opportunities for students from
economically challenges families).
149. See Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16.
150. See Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16.
151. See Hensel, supra note 99.
152. See Oluwole & Green III, supra note 138; Susan Etscheidt, Vouchers and Students
with Disabilities A Multidimensional Analysis, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD., 156-58 (2005).
153. See Minow, supra note 82.
154. Greene & Buck, supra note 144, at 36.
155. Id.
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incorporate several key protections.156 Specifically, statewide reform
initiatives must include critical IDEA provisions in the existing and proposed
special education voucher programs.157
Extending the parental rights doctrine to protect students with
disabilities can be achieved, in part, through choice initiatives such as the
special education voucher programs emerging across the states.158 Efforts to
protect parental rights should also include legislative reform of the IDEA to
revise provisions that limit the availability of guaranteed protections and
funding to meet the educational needs of students with disabilities. In the
present form, the IDEA serves as an unintended barrier to parents of students
with disabilities who desire meaningful choice and control over the
upbringing of their children.159
If the IDEA were amended to include a mechanism consistent with
the child benefit theory,160 this would enable parents to exercise true choice
but not be forced to give up public funding, significant disability protections,
accountability provisions, etc. In other words, by adopting a child benefit
theory perspective, in essence an IDEA voucher could permit funding and
protections that accompany the child beyond the traditional public school
boundaries.
Legislative reform of the IDEA is consistent with previous Supreme
Court rulings that extended governmental protections and funding to students
in private school settings, in spite of concerns about perceived religious
entanglement in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. For
example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court concluded that
the school voucher program adopted by Ohio was neutral and exemplified “a
program of true private choice.”161 Finally, according to the Court, the case
presented no challenges to the Establishment Clause.

156. See generally Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16 (proposing future SVP
legislative recommendations that include model components such as a purpose statement,
minimal federal disability law protections, notice and communication mechanisms, dispute
resolution procedures, and accountability measures).
157. Marie Rauschenberger, Resolving the Lack of Private-School Accountability in
State-Funded Special Education Voucher Programs, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1125 (2015).
158. Bon, Decker, & Strassfeld, supra note 16, at 505.
159. Joseph R. McKinney & Julie F. Mead, Law and Policy in Conflict: Including
Students with Disabilities in Parental-Choice Programs, 32 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 107 (1996).
160. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983) (permitting tax benefits for parents
who spent money on “tuition, textbooks and transportation” for their children in both public
and private schools because the money benefited the child directly and the religious school
indirectly.); See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding
state program that provided tuition assistance to blind students for higher education or
training institutions directly benefited the individual student and thus did not offend the First
Amendment Establishment Clause when student attended religious institution using the state
provided funds).
161. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
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CONCLUSION
Striking an appropriate balance between parental rights and state
interests in educating children has been a recurrent theme in the courts for
over eight decades.162 The exercise of parental rights to control the
upbringing of their children and to determine an appropriate education should
not depend solely on governmental expectations regarding desired outcomes
or societal benefits of education. Further, the rights of parents of students
with disabilities should not be infringed upon or modified purely to achieve
governmental interests that exceed the state’s efforts or responsibilities to
provide education.
As stated in Meyer, an individual’s “liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect.”163 Although special education voucher
programs include potential challenges, such as economic, racially
discriminatory, or exclusionary impacts on public school students who are
left behind,164 many of these challenges could be addressed through efforts
to extend federal protections to parents who exercise choice.
This article advocates for a reform agenda that aligns with the child
benefit theory,165 because such efforts have the potential to create improved
educational possibilities for students.166 Furthermore, with this trend,
observers note that the distinction between public and private sectors must
continue to be blurred.167 The changing political landscape is likely to
facilitate renewed efforts to promote education reform agendas that include
an emphasis on providing an increased number of choice options for parents
of students with disabilities. The debate over parental rights is no longer
narrowly focused on choice. Instead, parental choice should expand to
incorporate a continuum of educational opportunities, especially for parents
of students with disabilities, to secure education that is both high quality and
consistent with parental values and beliefs.168

162. See e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
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Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53 (2014).
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